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PAROLEES AND THE EROSION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
SECTION 3067 AND THE SUSPICIONLESS
SEARCH REGIME IT AUTHORIZES
Shaun H. Crosner*
I. INTRODUCTION

Outraged over a string of high-profile criminal cases involving
parolees, the people of California in 1996 proposed a bill that
ultimately would become the subject of considerable controversy.'
The words of the bill's author express the state's concerns: "Prison
inmates are released early from prison regardless of the threat they
pose to our communities. We must give our local law enforcement
officers the tools they need to adequately supervise these parolees."'
Seemingly in agreement with this assessment, the state legislature
responded with section 3067 of the California Penal Code. 3
Section 3067 requires every prisoner eligible for parole to agree
in writing "to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or
other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant and with or without cause."4 Though California has
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., May 2005,
University of Southern California. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to Professors
Allan Ides and Samuel Pillsbury for their invaluable assistance. I also want to thank the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their efforts on this note. Finally, I wish to
express my heartfelt gratitude to my family and friends for their constant encouragement and
unwavering support throughout the years.
1. The bill was introduced in the wake of the uproar following the kidnapping and murder
of 12-year-old Polly Klass by Richard Allen Davis, a convicted felon out on parole. AB No.
2284 BILL ANALYSIS (1996), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/95-96/bill/asm/ab_22512300/ab_2284 cfa_960830_031055_asm floor.html [hereinafter AB No. 2284 ANALYSIS].
2. Id.
3. Assemb. B. 2284, 1995-1996 S. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996) (codified at CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3067 (Deering Supp. 2007)).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(a) (emphasis added).
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never applied traditional warrant requirements5 to searches of its
parolees,6 section 3067 is constitutionally remarkable in one material
respect. Prior to section 3067, every parole or probation search
condition-in California or any other state-required at least
Section 3067 is thus the nation's first
reasonable suspicion.'
codification of a suspicionless search condition for parolees,8 making
it arguably the most severe legislative intrusion on parolees' Fourth
Amendment 9 rights in United States legal history.
In a 6-3 vote, the United States Supreme Court recently
validated a parole search conducted in the absence of suspicion under
the authority of section 3067.10 The Court's decision is not too
surprising given that it has been watering down the Fourth
Amendment for decades. For instance, recent Supreme Court
decisions have relaxed warrant and probable cause requirements in
5. As a general rule, warrants are required to make a search or seizure reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
6. See, e.g., In re Tyrell J., 876 P.2d. 519, 535 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting) (noting
that in California "every grant of parole included an implied [warrantless] search condition" even
before it became common to codify such conditions). Probationers, like parolees, have long been
subject to warrantless searches as well. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121
(2001) (holding that a law enforcement officer needs only reasonable suspicion, and not a warrant
supported by probable cause, to conduct a search of a probationer's home). Knights is discussed
in depth infra Part II.A.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 376 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding
Pennsylvania's parole search condition to include "an implicit requirement that any search be
based on reasonable suspicion"); People v. Woods, 535 N.W.2d 259, 261-62 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995); State ex rel. Corgan v. King, 868 P.2d 743, 746 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that
Oklahoma's parole search condition requires reasonable suspicion); People v. Slusher, 844 P.2d
1222, 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that a parole search must be predicated on "reasonable
grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred").
8. No other state has codified a suspicionless parolee search condition. Reply Brief for the
Petitioner at 8-9, Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (No. 04-9728). However, the
courts of one state have expressed judicial approval of probation searches conducted in the
absence of particularized suspicion. In a 1999 decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
suspicionless searches to be theoretically permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Smith, 589 N.W.2d 546, 550 (N.D. 1999) (holding that reasonable suspicion is not necessary for
probation searches, but finding that the search in question was supported by reasonable
suspicion). Still, it is worth noting that North Dakota courts have yet to apply the Smith holding
to a suspicionless search. See, e.g., State v. Maurstad, 647 N.W.2d 688, 695 (N.D. 2002) (finding
no reason to "apply our prior case law holding reasonable suspicion" as unnecessary because, as
in Smith, the search in question was supported by reasonable suspicion).
9. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in pertinent part, reads: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion to the case that was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer. Id. at 2202 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). For a full discussion of the Court's opinion in Samson, see infra Part II.A.
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airports." Moreover, the Court has essentially suspended warrant
requirements for automobile searches. 12 The Court has even applied
the so-called automobile exception to motor homes. 3
Still, despite the recent trend in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, section 3067-with its allowances for suspicionless
searches of parolees-takes privacy intrusions to a higher level. This
note questions the body of case law validating the constitutionality of
section 3067. Part II summarizes existing section 3067 case law by
looking at landmark state and federal court decisions. Part III
criticizes the decisions of these courts and argues that section 3067
does not pass constitutional muster. Finally, Part IV suggests
changes to section 3067 that, while keeping in mind government
interests, would improve the statute from a constitutional standpoint.
II. EXISTING CASE LAW

Both state and federal courts have weighed in on the
constitutionality of section 3067 and warrantless searches. While
some of the cases have dealt with the statute as applied to parolees,
others have addressed section 3067 and its application to non-parolee
third parties.
A. Section 3067 as Applied to Parolees

In People v. Reyes,'4 the California Supreme Court reviewed the
case of Rudolfo Reyes and established the state's stance on parolees'
Fourth Amendment rights. A police officer arrested Reyes after
receiving an anonymous tip that he was under the influence of
drugs. 5 After searching Reyes' shed, the officer found a small
amount of methamphetamine. 6 Reyes pled guilty to a drug
11. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). The Court in Place refused
to apply traditional Fourth Amendment requirements to dog sniffs performed by trained canines
in airports because it did not view them as "searches" for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id.
12. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970) (holding that a warrantless search of
an automobile is permissible so long as there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is
carrying contraband or fruits of a crime).
13. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (extending the automobile exception
because motor homes, like more traditional automobiles, can be moved quickly by an individual
seeking to avoid a search).
14. 968 P.2d 445 (Cal. 1998).
15. Id. at 446. The Court of Appeal found that this anonymous tip did not amount to
reasonable suspicion. Id.
16. Id.
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possession charge after a trial court ruled that this evidence-despite
its having been obtained pursuant to a suspicionless parole searchwas admissible against him. 7
The California Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether reasonable suspicion was necessary for a parole search 8 and
held that the Fourth Amendment imposed no such requirement. 9
The court found that search conditions designed to "deter the
commission of crimes" were more effective if "enhanced by the
potential for random searches."2 Still, while the court validated the
search of Reyes, it was quick to point out that a parolee retains some
constitutional protections.2 The court noted that a parole search
conducted arbitrarily or capriciously would be unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. 2
The United States Supreme Court has also tackled the issue of
search conditions. In United States v. Knights, 23 the Court reviewed

the case of Mark James Knights, a probationer 24 who had signed a
probation order containing language similar to section 3067.25
Knights, who was on probation 26 for an unrelated drug offense, had
been a primary suspect in a string of over thirty acts of vandalism

17. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at451.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
24. Section 3067 applies only to parolees, but cases of probationers such as Knights remain
highly relevant to the discussion at hand. Courts have repeatedly taken the stance that there is no
"constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment."
United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1991).
25. The probation order, much like section 3067, conditioned Knights' continued freedom
on his willingness to "'[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal
effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable
cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer."' Knights, 534 U.S. at 114.
26. Though probation and parole operate similarly, the two sanctions also have their notable
differences. Probation is a punishment given out in lieu of a prison sentence, and it is typically
reserved for those individuals convicted of minor crimes without a required minimum prison
sentence. Probation is usually characterized by little or no government supervision. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203 (West Supp. 2007). Parole, on the other hand, is generally granted at or near the
end of a prison sentence. Because parolees have been convicted of crimes serious enough to
merit imprisonment, the government monitors parolees much more closely than it does
probationers. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.
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against Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E") facilities. 7 After an act of
arson at PG&E, a detective with knowledge of Knights's probation
condition searched his residence and discovered various explosive
materials and detonation devices.2 ' Knights sought to suppress the
evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his residence,
arguing that the search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 9
The United States Supreme Court found that the police officer's
search of Knights's residence was "supported by reasonable
suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation" and thus
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.3" In making its decision,
the Court applied traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, which
determines the reasonableness of a search by examining the totality
of the circumstances.3 The totality of the circumstances approach,
as applied in Knights and numerous other Fourth Amendment cases,
is a two-prong balancing test that looks at (1) the degree to which a
search infringes upon an individual's legitimate expectation of
privacy; and (2) the extent to which the search is necessary to
promote "legitimate governmental interests. 3
The Court balanced the state's legitimate interest in reducing
crime and monitoring parolees against Knights's reduced expectation
of privacy in light of his status as a probationer.3 The Court found
that Knights's probation search condition was "a salient
circumstance" that weighed toward finding the warrantless search
reasonable.34 The Court's analysis, however, ultimately turned on
the fact that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Knights was
engaged in criminal activity. The Court found that reasonable
suspicion, rather than the usual requirement of probable cause,

27. PG&E had filed a theft-of-services complaint against Knights, and criminal charges
followed. A detective had noticed that the acts of vandalism coincided with Knights' court
appearances in the matter. Knights, 534 U.S. at 114-15.
28. Id. at 115.
29. Id. at 116-17.
30. Id. at 122.
31. Id.; see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (noting that the reasonableness of a
search "is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances").
32. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). The Knights Court employed the
same balancing test as the one used by the Court in Houghton. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119.
33. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-21.
34. Id. at 118.
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satisfied the Fourth Amendment because probationers such as
Knights are much more statistically likely to violate the law than are
normal citizens.35
In applying the two-prong totality of the circumstances
balancing test, the Knights Court set forth guidelines for Fourth
Amendment analysis that subsequent courts would follow.36
However, because the search in Knights was supported by reasonable
suspicion, the Court did not feel compelled to address the
constitutionality of a search conducted in the absence of
individualized suspicion.37 The Court in Samson v. California"
would later address this unresolved issue.
In Samson, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the
conviction of Donald Curtis Samson.39 Samson was a parolee at the
time of his arrest.4" An officer had stopped Samson as he was
walking down the street with two companions.41 The officer
recognized Samson from prior contacts and searched him solely
based on his status as a parolee.42 The officer found a plastic baggie
containing methamphetamine on Samson's person and arrested
him.43 The trial court convicted Samson of possession of a controlled
substance and sentenced him to seven years imprisonment.44
After the California Court of Appeal affirmed Samson's
conviction,45 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine whether a suspicionless parole search could be reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.46 The Court applied traditional Fourth

35. Id. at 121.
36. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197 (2006) (looking to the Knights
Court's analysis for guidance in analyzing the constitutionality of section 3067).
37. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 n.6 ("We do not decide whether the probation condition so
diminished, or completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a
search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.").
38. 126 S. Ct. at 2196.
39. Id.
40. Samson was on parole following a conviction for being a felon in possession of a

firearm. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Amendment analysis, examining the "totality of the circumstances"
in an effort to determine the reasonableness of Samson's search. 7
The Court, 48 echoing its sentiments in Knights, noted that Fourth
Amendment totality of the circumstances analysis calls for a
balancing of legitimate government interests against an individual's
expectation of privacy. 9
The Samson Court first looked at the expectations of parolees,
ultimately finding that their status precluded them from having any
reasonable expectation of normal Fourth Amendment protections."
Viewing parolees as more akin to prisoners than probationers on the
"'continuum' of state-imposed punishments," the Court treated
Under this
parole as an extension of a prison sentence.'
interpretation, the "inmate-turned-parolee" remained in the "legal
custody of the California Department of Corrections" and was
subject to the rules set by that entity. 2 Accordingly, the Court found
any expectation of privacy by a parolee to be patently unreasonable,
especially considering that parolees such as Samson consent to the
section 3067 suspicionless search condition. 3
Though the Court refused to recognize the parolee's expectation
of privacy as legitimate, the government interests at stake actually
drove the Samson Court's holding. California's high recidivism
rates-which measure the number of parolees returned to prison for
either a parole violation or the commission of a new felony
offense-played an especially important role in the Court's
analysis.5 4 In conducting its totality of the circumstances balancing
test, the Court gave particular weight to California's stated goal of
reducing its recidivism rate, which at roughly 70 percent was the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 2197.
The majority opinion in Samson was written by Justice Clarence Thomas. Id. at 2196.
Id. at 2197.
Id. at 2199.
Id. at 2198.
Id. at 2199.
53. Id. Though it viewed parolees' consent to the search condition as a noteworthy factor in
its totality of the circumstances analysis, the Court declined to rest its holding on "consent
rationale." Id. at 2199-200 n.3. The Court felt it could base its holding on traditional Fourth
Amendment totality of the circumstances balancing, and the Court was also not convinced that
the State had "properly raised its consent theory" in the lower courts. Id.
54. See id. at 2200 (noting that a state's interest in reducing recidivism warrants privacy
intrusions not otherwise tolerated under the Fourth Amendment).
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highest in the nation." The Court argued that imposing a reasonable
suspicion requirement would unduly undermine the state's ability to
combat its recidivism problem.6
The Samson Court also made a point of addressing "[t]he
concern that [California's suspicionless search] system gives officers
unbridled discretion to conduct searches."57 The Court found that
any such concern was "belied by California's prohibition on
'arbitrary, capricious or harassing' searches."" To further bolster
this position, the Court pointed to the text of section 3067, which
indicates that the Legislature did not intend to authorize harassing
searches of parolees. 9 The Court ultimately concluded that these
prohibitions were constitutionally sufficient safeguards to protect
against the threat of police misconduct.6"
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Souter
and Breyer, criticized the Samson majority's logic.6 He noted that
the majority used circular reasoning when it applied the totality of
the circumstances balancing test, thereby tainting its ultimate
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of section 3067.62
Stevens also criticized the majority for placing too much emphasis
on California's recidivism problem, noting that high crime rates have
never justified Fourth Amendment intrusions as serious as those
allowed under the Court's decision.63 Moreover, Stevens argued that
section 3067, in violation of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement, gives officers in the field largely unrestrained
discretion.'
To Stevens and the other dissenting Justices, the
majority's sanction of section 3067 amounted to an "unprecedented
curtailment of [Fourth Amendment] liberty."65

55. Id.
56. Id. at 2200-201.
57. Id. at 2202.
58. Id. (quoting People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 451 (Cal. 1998)).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3067(d) (West 2000) ("It is not the intent of the Legislature to
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.").
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2202.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2207 n.6.
Id. at 2204.
Id. at 2202.
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The bulk of section 3067 cases, like Samson, apply the statute to
members of California's parolee population.6 6 However, federal and
state courts have also reviewed cases in which the statute is applied
to non-parolee third parties.
B. Section 3067 as Applied to Non-Parolee Third Parties
While relatively few in number, the cases that apply section
3067 to non-parolees are highly relevant to the debate over the
statute's constitutionality. To begin, in Motley v. Parks,6 7 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the constitutionality of a search of
non-parolee Dana Motley's apartment.6 8 Motley's apartment was
located in a gang-ridden Los Angeles neighborhood.69 In an effort to
"clean up" the neighborhood, local police officers-acting under the
authority of section 3067--decided to randomly search the
residences of ten parolees with gang ties. 7' At the time, officers
believed that one such individual, Janae Jamerson, was residing with
Motley at her apartment. 7' However, unbeknownst to these officers,
Jamerson had violated his parole a few days before the planned
search and was back in custody. When police officers arrived for
the search, Motley told them Jamerson was back in custody, but they
searched her home anyway. 73 After finding nothing linking Motley
or Jamerson to criminal activity, the officers left.74

66. The focus of this Note does not allow for a thorough discussion of every section 3067
case reviewing the statute's application to parolees. Other important section 3067 cases include
People v. Willis, 46 P.3d 898 (Cal. 2002) (looking at the applicability of exclusionary rules to
evidence discovered by a state parole officer and police during a search they conducted without
suspicion under the erroneous belief that defendant was on parole), and United States v. Albert,
No. CR-05-00487-DLJ, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54746 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2006) (applying the
"arbitrary, capricious, or harassing" standard discussed in Samson).
67. 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 1076.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
Id. at 1076.

74. Id. at 1076-77.
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Motley filed an action75 against the officers alleging that they
had violated her and her infant son's Fourth Amendment rights.76
The district court granted summary judgment for the officers." The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that
"before conducting a warrantless search" under section 3067,
"officers must have probable cause to believe that the parolee is a
resident of the house to be searched. ' 7 Applying the facts of the
case, the court found that the officers indeed had probable cause to
believe that Jamerson lived with Motley at her residence. 79 The
officers testified to relying on the information gathered by the Los
Angeles Police Department regarding Jamerson's parole status, and
the court found that this reliance was objectively reasonable.8"
An important state court decision involving section 3067's
impact on third parties is People v. Middleton."' In Middleton, the

California Court of Appeal reviewed the conviction of Michael
Middleton. 2 On the night of his arrest, Middleton was staying in
room 126 of the Travel Lodge Motel in Fairfield, California. 3
Officers patrolling the motel parking lot84 were told that individuals
were smoking marijuana in room 126.5 When the officers knocked
on the door of room 126 to investigate, they heard the room's
occupants run into room 111 through an adjoining door.86 An officer

75. Motley's action was filed in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a
private cause of action against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute ... subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [federal]
Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
76. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1077. Motley also alleged that one of the officers, in training a gun

on her infant son for a prolonged period of time, used excessive force during the course of the
search.

The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that this action was objectively unreasonable and

reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the excessive force claim. Id. at
1088-89.
77. Id. at 1077.

78. Id. at 1080.
79. Id. at 1080-83.
80. Id. at 1081-82.

81.
82.
83.
84.

31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 814.
See id. at 815-16.
Officers were patrolling the area because the surrounding vicinity was considered to be a

high drug area. Id.at 815.
85. Id.

86. Id.
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then went to the motel manager's office and determined that room
111 was registered to Maurice Hurth, an active parolee."
Based on this information, the officers decided to conduct a
warrantless search of Hurth's room.8 8 The officers entered room 111
to find Middleton and four others inside; they also found a handgun,
later determined to be Middleton's. 9 Though Hurth was not in the
The
room, the officers detained Middleton and his companions.
officers then decided to look for Hurth in room 126, and the detained
Middleton consented to the search.9' In room 126, officers found
weapons, cocaine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia-all belonging
to Middleton. 2
The trial court admitted the evidence found in both rooms
against Middleton, who pled guilty to multiple drug and firearm
offenses after losing a motion to suppress the evidence. 3 The
California Court of Appeal affirmed Middleton's convictions. 4 In
reaching its decision, the court relied principally on the fact that the
officers did not enter room 111 until they had determined that the
room was registered to Hurth, an active parolee. 5 The court did not
expressly examine the constitutionality of the search of room 126,
but a fair reading of the opinion indicates that it found Middleton's
consent to the search to be valid.96
Arguably, state and federal courts have incorrectly validated
unconstitutional searches conducted under the authority of section
3067. Accordingly, the next section of this note criticizes existing
section 3067 case law and questions the legal reasoning of the courts.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 816.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 819.
95. Id. at 818.
96. Middleton had argued that his consent to the search of room 126 was involuntary
because it resulted from an unlawful detention. Id. at 817. Once the court held that the search of
room 111 was constitutional, it implicitly held that the detention of Middleton was lawful, in
effect dismissing Middleton's argument that his consent was involuntary. Id. at 818.
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III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING CASE LAW
In an apparent nod to California's high recidivism rates,9 7 courts
have consistently validated section 3067 and the suspicionless
searches it condones. However, the judicial approval of section 3067
is somewhat baffling, for the statute's constitutionality remains
highly dubious. Section 3067 seems to lack any firm constitutional
footing, and it impermissibly infringes on the Fourth Amendment
rights of both California's parolees and non-parolee third parties.
Moreover, the statute fails to adequately protect parolees against
harassment by police officers. Even if these deficiencies are not
constitutionally dispositive, they certainly lead to the conclusion that
section 3067 could benefit from some modification.
A. Applying TraditionalFourth Amendment
Analysis to Section 3067
Fourth Amendment analysis generally turns on whether or not a
given search is reasonable.98 Courts typically determine a search's
reasonableness by "examining the totality of the circumstances."99
This approach assesses (1) how significantly a search intrudes on an
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and (2) the degree to
which the search is "needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.""1 Even though in Samson the United States
Supreme Court upheld section 3067 using the totality of the
circumstances approach, 1 ' the Court's analysis was arguably
characterized by "faulty syllogism" and "circular reasoning." ' 2
While the totality of the circumstances approach is fairly flexible, the
Court took far too many liberties in arriving at its suspect conclusion.
1. The Parolee's Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Samson Court found that California parolees subject to the
section 3067 search condition, had no "expectation of privacy that

97. For a general discussion of recidivism in California, see discussion infra Part III.A.2.
98. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19 (2001).
99. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Exceptions to this general approach include
the special needs doctrine and consent rationale, discussed infra Part III.B. 1-2.
100. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
101. See generally Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006), discussed supra Part II.A.
102. Id. at 2202 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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society would recognize as legitimate."'' 3 The Samson majority
classified parole as "'an established variation on imprisonment,"'
which allowed for the conclusion that parolees are more akin to
prisoners than probationers."° However, even if one ascribed to this
viewpoint, there is no logical reason to presume that parolees are the
same as prisoners-who have absolutely no legitimate expectation of
privacy.0 5 For that conclusion to be tenable, a parolee would have to
be unequivocally equated with a prisoner for the purposes of Fourth
Yet, precedent has long distinguished
Amendment analysis.' °6
0
7
parolees from prisoners, and rightfully so. Unlike prisoners, whose
activities and movement are closely followed, parolees' lives are
characterized by "many of the core values of unqualified liberty."'0 8
Parolees generally choose where they go and what they do, at least to
a substantially greater degree than prisoners.0 9 This relative freedom
makes it difficult to conclude that a parolee has no legitimate
expectation of privacy.
Furthermore, while searches of prisoners do not require
individualized suspicion,"0 the rationale for suspending prisoners'
Fourth Amendment rights does not logically extend to parolees. It is
necessary to strip prisoners of Fourth Amendment rights to
"accommodate a myriad of 'institutional needs and objectives,"'
namely the internal security of the prison facility."' If prisoners
could not be searched randomly, the safety of both prisoners and
guards would be severely jeopardized." 2

103. Id. at 2199.
104. Id. at 2198 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)).
105. Id. at 2204-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out the illogic of comparing parolees'
privacy interests to those of prisoners simply because the two groups share some superficial
similarities).
106. Id. at 2202-03.
107. See, e.g., Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 (noting that a parolee's "condition is very different
from that of confinement in a prison").
108. Id.
109. The activity of parolees and probationers is, however, often restricted. For instance, in
the federal system, probationers can be prohibited from frequenting certain places or associating
with certain individuals believed to be associated with crime. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(6) (2000).
110. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984) (holding that prisoners have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their cells).
111. Id. at 524.
112. See id. at 526-28.
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However, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting opinion in
Samson, the concerns necessitating suspicionless searches of
prisoners simply do not exist outside the walls of a penitentiary." 3
Prisons-self-contained units housing criminals deemed unfit for
society-present unique administrative quandaries that necessitate
severe Fourth Amendment intrusions; the same cannot rationally be
said, however, of everyday society.
Hence, the Samson majority wisely offered another more
compelling justification for its failure to recognize parolees' Fourth
Amendment rights. The Samson Court argued that parolees, because
they signed an order submitting to the search condition, were
"'unambiguously' aware of it."'' 4 According to the majority,
awareness of the section 3067 search condition significantly reduced
a California parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy." 5 When
closely analyzed, however, this contention crumbles. Under the
majority's logic, any state infringement on its citizens' constitutional
rights would be allowable so long as the citizen was forewarned. As
the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Smith v.
7
Maryland,'16 this obviously cannot be the case."
The Smith Court noted that "if the Government were suddenly to
announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would
be subject to warrantless entry," citizens' subjective expectations of
privacy would become irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis." 8
As evidenced by the hypothetical scenario advanced in Smith, notice
of an unreasonable Fourth Amendment intrusion does not necessarily
extinguish otherwise legitimate privacy interests.'
Thus, while it
undoubtedly plays some role in determining the overall
reasonableness of a search, mere notice of a potential section 3067
search cannot be determinative of reasonableness. As such, the
Samson majority's reliance on the notice argument calls into serious

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2206 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2199 (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
Id.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 740 n.5.

118. Id. (noting that, where a state conditions subjective expectations with "influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms," the inquiry into subjective expectations becomes
an "inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection").
119. See id.
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question its ultimate conclusions regarding California parolees'
expectations of privacy.
2. The State's Interests
Although the Samson Court may not have adequately disproved
the existence of Fourth Amendment rights for California parolees, an
overwhelmingly compelling state interest would likely make up for
this deficiency. In fairness, the Samson majority puts forth a fairly
compelling argument regarding California's interest in reducing
recidivism and monitoring parolees.'20 As the United States Supreme
Court has noted in the past,' 2 ' the problem of recidivism implicates
serious safety issues. The situation in California, the Samson Court
As of late 2005, California's
noted, is especially disconcerting.'
parolee population topped 130,000, and the group had the highest
recidivism rate in the nation at nearly 70 percent.'23
Still, notwithstanding the legitimacy of California's interest in
controlling and reducing recidivism, it is probably a stretch to say
that the interest justifies suspicionless searches. In his dissenting
opinion to Samson, Justice Stevens said, "If high crime rates were
grounds enough for disposing of Fourth Amendment protections, the
Amendment long ago would have become a dead letter."' 2 4 Hence,
while certainly disconcerting, California's struggles with recidivism
do not excuse the severe Fourth Amendment intrusions allowed
under section 3067.
Moreover, while the statistics appear to paint an especially dire
picture, the Samson Court may have paid too much heed to
California's seemingly astronomical recidivism rates. For starters,
not all states use the same definition of recidivism for statistical
purposes, making it difficult to accurately compare statistics of
different states.' 25 Further, California's hard-line stance on parole
120. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200.
121. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (plurality opinion).
122. See Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2200 (using California's high recidivism rates as justification
for section 3067's regime of suspicionless searches).
123. Id. For the purposes of this statistic, recidivism occurs when a paroled felon is returned
to prison within 18 months of release for violating parole. Id. (citing Joan Petersilia, Challenges
of PrisonerReentry and Parolein California, CPRC BRIEF (Cal. Pol'y Res. Ctr., Berkeley, Cal.),
June 2000, availableat http://www.ucop.edu/cprc/docurnents/parole.pdf).
124. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. See Ryan G. Fischer, Are California's Recidivism Rates Really the Highest in the
Nation? It Depends on What Measure of Recidivism You Use, BULLETIN (UC Irvine Ctr. For
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violations may partially explain the state's high recidivism rates:
over half of California's so-called recidivist parolees return to prison
on technical violations." 6 This statistic is not overly surprising given
California's practice of placing nearly every released inmate under
the intense supervision of a parole officer.'27 In contrast, 40 percent
of North Carolina's parolees and 60 percent of Florida's parolees
have no supervision whatsoever.'28 Such lax supervisory programs,
employed to varying degrees by almost every state, no doubt cause
many parole violations to go undetected.'29 This probably leads
many states to report artificially low recidivism rates, which makes
California's comparatively high numbers somewhat misleading.
Even if the statistics might exaggerate California's woes,
however, the state's recidivism rates are hardly all smoke and
mirrors.'30 Still, numerous other states have serious recidivism
problems as well,' 3 ' but no other state has thus far felt the need to
codify suspicionless searches of parolees.132 While the choices of
other states do not necessarily make section 3067 constitutionally
deficient, it is interesting that virtually all other jurisdictions have
taken less aggressive approaches, while still achieving comparableor in most cases, lower-recidivism rates to California.133 In fact, it
is highly questionable whether section 3067 is even effective in
reducing recidivism, as the percentage of California parolees
Evidence-Based Corrections, Irvine, Cal.), Sept. 2005, at 1, available at http://
ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edulpdf/bulletin_2005_vol-l-is-I.pdf (pointing out the importance of
comparing "apples to apples" when looking at states' recidivism rates).
126. Id. at 3 tbl. 1 (noting that the percentage of parolees being returned to prison for technical
violations is considerably higher in California than in other states with large prison populations
such as New York, Florida, and Texas). But see JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH
CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 73-74 (2006), available at http://ucop.edu/
cprc/documents/understand ca corrections.pdf [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING
CALIFORNIA
CORRECTIONS] (arguing that, "despite their mild description," most technical violations in
California actually involve allegations of some sort of criminal activity).
127. Fischer, supra note 125, at 2.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 2 tbl. I (showing California's high rates of recidivism).
131. See id. at 3 tbl.2 (comparing California's recidivism rates with those of Florida, Illinois,
New York, North Carolina, and Texas).
132. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 8-9.
133. The nationwide recidivism rate was only half as great as California's during the 1990s.
TIMOTHY A. HUGHES ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRENDS
IN STATE PAROLE, 1990-2000, at 11 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.govbjs/pub/
pdf/tsp00.pdf [hereinafter TRENDS INSTATE PAROLE].
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successfully completing parole went virtually unchanged following
the adoption of the statute in 1996.114
Section 3067's apparent failure to effectively reduce recidivism
makes the statute somewhat difficult to justify under the totality of
the circumstances approach. Because neither prong of the totality of
the circumstances balancing test strongly compels the conclusion that
the statute is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, section 3067
cannot be upheld under traditional totality of the circumstances
analysis. Nonetheless, before the statute can be dismissed as
constitutionally deficient, two other exceptions to general Fourth
Amendment rules must be addressed.
B. The InapplicabilityofEither the Consent Rationale
or the Special Needs Doctrine to Section 3067
Even if section 3067 is unjustifiable under the totality of the
circumstances balancing approach, the statute is not necessarily
unconstitutional. Although the United States Supreme Court was
hesitant to do so in Samson, 135 courts have routinely validated
suspicionless searches under two exceptions to traditional Fourth
Amendment principles: (1) a consent rationale and (2) the special
needs doctrine. However, given their respective rationales, it is
highly arguable whether either exception even applies to section
3067 Fourth Amendment analysis.
1. Consent Rationale
Consent rationale provides a well-established exception to
traditional Fourth Amendment prohibitions on suspicionless
searches. 3 6 The doctrine recognizes a person's ability to waive their
Fourth Amendment rights and consent to an otherwise unreasonable

134. Id. (noting that 20.9 percent were successfully discharged from parole in 1995, while the
discharge rate only increased to 21.3 percent in 1999).
135. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2199 n.3 (2006) (majority declining to rest its
holding validating section 3067 on either consent rationale or the special needs exception because
(1) California did not clearly raise the consent argument in the lower courts; and (2) the holding
can be based entirely on totality of the circumstances analysis, making special needs examination
unnecessary).
136. See, e.g., Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (recognizing a voluntary waiver
to privacy claims under the Fourth Amendment); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
358 n.22 (1967) (noting that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent meets Fourth
Amendment reasonableness requirements).
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search or seizure. " 7 To be valid, the consent must be entirely
voluntary and not the product of duress or coercion of any sort. 38 A
search conducted pursuant to valid consent does not run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment so long as the search does not exceed the scope
of the consent.'39
California has sought to justify section 3067 on consent
grounds, 40 but the argument fails for a number of reasons. First and
foremost, most felonies in California carry a determinate sentence
"consisting of a specific number of months or years in prison."'' 41
42
Upon completion of this sentence, the inmate is released on parole'
and must accept the parole conditions provided by the Board of
Prison Terms. 43 Thus, consent rationale is inapplicable because a
California 144parolee has no real choice but to accept the search
condition.
Even if, for the sake of argument, a prisoner could opt for a
longer sentence in lieu of accepting a section 3067 search condition,
consent rationale would still not apply. First, it is probably a stretch
to call a parolee's assent to a section 3067 search condition purely
"voluntary." The promise of relative freedom, especially to an
individual who has had no such freedom for some time, is arguably
an irresistible inducement. 45 Thus, a parolee's acceptance of a
section 3067 search condition might best be viewed as the product of
coercion, not voluntary consent.
Moreover, prisoners up for parole cannot logically "consent" to
suspicionless searches, for they have no true alternative option.
137. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (citing Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946)).
138. Id. at 248-49. The Court seems to guard other constitutional rights, namely those
playing a role in criminal trials, more closely. For instance, while voluntary consent waives
Fourth Amendment rights under Schneckloth, valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel must also be knowing and intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938).
139. See Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982) (upholding seizure of contraband
during a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent).
140. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 33-37, Samson v. California, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (2006)
(No. 04-9728).
141. People v. Jefferson, 980 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1999).
142. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(b)(1) (West 2007) ("At the expiration of a term . . . of
imprisonment imposed pursuant to Section 1170... the inmate shall be released on parole ... .
143. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 448 (Cal. 1998).
144. See Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2206 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.10(b) (4th ed. 2007).

Fal12007]

PAROLEES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

431

Would-be parolees only have the nominal choice of either (1)
remaining in prison and being subjected to suspicionless searches
under Hudson'46 or (2) leaving prison and being subjected to
suspicionless searches under section 3067.141 Clearly, these supposed
alternatives present no real choice at all, other than perhaps one of
venue. A prisoner faced with this decision only chooses where-not
whether-he wishes to be subjected to suspicionless searches.
Absent a distinct alternative, a prisoner cannot logically be said to
"consent" to a suspicionless search.148 Thus, consent rationale makes
little sense in the context of section 3067 searches. A much stronger
argument, however, can be made for the special needs exception.
2. The Special Needs Doctrine
Under the special needs doctrine, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized another limited exception to Fourth
Amendment requirements. The exception recognizes that, in certain
instances, states have an important interest that makes "the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable.' 1 49 The special needs
exception has been recognized in several areas. For one, government
employers are allowed to conduct work-related searches of
employees' desks and offices without obtaining a warrant.'50 The
exception also permits public school officials to conduct warrantless
searches of student property absent probable cause to do so.' 5' The
special needs exception has even been used to justify probationer
searches. In Griffin v. Wisconsin,'52 the United States Supreme Court
recognized the supervision of probationers as a "'special need' of the
State," allowing probation officers to conduct searches of
probationers without requiring individualized suspicion.'

146. Under Hudson v. Palmer, wardens and prison guards can search prisoners' cells at
random without offending the Fourth Amendment. 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984).
147. See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2206 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that prisoners
facing parole have no real "'choice' concerning the search condition").
148. Id.
149. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
150. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720-21 (1987) (citing United States v. Nasser, 476
F.2d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1965)).
151. TL.O.,469U.S. at332n.2.
152. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
153. Id. at 875-76.
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According to California, the special needs exception justifies
section 3067 searches based on the state's interest in monitoring and
supervising its rather sizable parolee population.'54 In fairness,
parolees' relative likelihood to commit future crimes-at least when
compared to regular citizens--does present a judicially recognized
threat to public safety.'55 Since safety concerns typically motivate
the special needs exception,'56 California's argument is not entirely
baseless. Also, as has been discussed, the Griffin Court recognized
the state interest in supervising probationers, 5 7 a group similarly
situated to parolees for the purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis. 5 ' The state supervisory interest is arguably even stronger
for parolees than probationers, for parolees have generally
committed more egregious crimes-"ones warranting a prior term of
imprisonment"--than probationers.'59
Still, although it may seem logical to apply Griffin by analogy to
section 3067 suspicionless searches, there is one subtle but important
In Griffin, and in all other cases validating a
difference.
suspicionless search under the special needs doctrine, the search in
question was conducted for purposes completely "divorced from the
State's general interest in law enforcement."' 60 Therefore, the
exception simply cannot justify section 3067 searches, for
suspicionless searches of parolees are inherently related to law
enforcement. If a section 3067 search could be upheld under the
special needs doctrine merely to make crime-fighting simpler for
California's police officers, the special needs exception would be
made "so broad as to swallow the rule of Fourth Amendment

154. Respondent's Brief on the Merits, supra note 140, at 22, 27.
155. See, e.g., Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998).
156. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)
(noting that the special needs exception applies to searches designed to "preventthe development
of hazardous conditions" that threaten public health and safety).
157.
158.
always
159.
160.

Griffin, 483 U.S. at 876.
United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 376 n.l (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that courts have
treated parolees and probationers identically for Fourth Amendment purposes).
Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2205 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001).
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reasonableness."''
For this reason, the exception has always been
62
narrowly construed.'
Additionally, while section 3067 searches are conducted by
police officers, the special needs doctrine has traditionally applied
only to searches made by non-law-enforcement.' 63 This limitation on
the special needs doctrine makes considerable sense from a practical
standpoint. Most government officials are ill-equipped to determine
whether reasonable suspicion exists." 6
Teachers and school
administrators, for example, are not in the business of investigating
crimes, and as such they cannot be expected to know of reasonable
suspicion's niceties.'65 However, the same cannot rationally be said
of police officers, whose main function in society is to ferret out
violations in the law.'66 Officers are well-acquainted with Fourth
Amendment constraints, since warrants-which are not issued absent
probable cause 16-are required for virtually all searches related to
law enforcement. Accordingly, unlike most government officials,
police officers can be expected to competently determine whether a
16
search is justified by their level of suspicion.
Another important distinction between section 3067
suspicionless searches and valid special needs searches involves the
nature of the relationship between the government official and the
party being searched. Even if it falls short of the traditional
definition, a search takes on something close to individualized
suspicion when based on a more intimate relationship. For instance,
a probation officer searches a probationer with subjective knowledge
of his individual situation, including the probationer's background
and character traits.'69 Suspicionless section 3067 searches, on the
161. Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Northern
California in Support of Petitioner at 6, Samson, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (No. 04-9728)
[hereinafter Brief for ACLU].
162. Id. at 7 (noting that a "long and consistent pedigree attaches to the judicial insistence
upon cabining the special needs doctrine").
163. See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
164. Brief for ACLU, supra note 161, at 9.
165. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985).
166. Brief for ACLU, supra note 161, at 10.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation").
168. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987).
169. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879 (1987) (noting that a probation agency can
proceed with a search "on the basis of its entire experience with the probationer").
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other hand, are made in an entirely different context. Under the
statute, a police officer could theoretically search a parolee based
solely on the latter's parolee status without any personal knowledge
of his specific circumstances. This type of search falls woefully
short of anything resembling individualized suspicion.
Considering all of this, the special needs doctrine does not
logically justify section 3067 suspicionless searches. Even if the
searches at issue fit neatly under the umbrella of the special needs
exception, it is still highly doubtful that the statute would be deemed
constitutional. Although the Fourth Amendment does not impose an
"irreducible requirement of such [individualized] suspicion,"' 17' no
court has ever used the special needs exception to validate a search
regime without the existence of adequate safeguards being in place to
limit the discretion of police officers.' 71 On its face, section 3067
contains no such restraint.
C. Section 3067's Lack of Effective Procedural
SafeguardsAgainst ParoleeHarassment
Even if there were no other rational challenge to section 3067,
the statute would arguably fail under constitutional scrutiny because
of its "blanket grant of discretion untethered by any procedural
safeguards.' ' 7' The nation's early history sheds considerable light on
this argument. During the colonial era, the King's officersauthorized by liberally granted writs of assistance-had authority to
search whomever and whatever they pleased.'73 Hatred for this
practice ultimately played a large role in spurring the American
Revolution, 74 and it also led the constitutional framers to draft the
Fourth Amendment.'75
170. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Brignon-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882 (1975) (finding that the
"Fourth Amendment demands something more than the broad and unlimited discretion sought by
the government"); see also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (noting that a
proper administrative searching scheme must limit the discretion of inspecting officers and be
"carefully limited in time, place, and scope").
172. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 n.21 (1980) (describing pre-Revolutionary
conditions).
174. Id.
175. See Tracey Maclin, The CentralMeaning of the FourthAmendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 197, 247-48 (1993) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was intended to keep the newly
formed government from resurrecting the writs of assistance searching scheme).
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Given the nation's deep-rooted detestation of blanket search
warrants, it is hard to defend the large amount of relatively
unchecked power that section 3067 places in the hands of police
officers. After all, the statute seems to permit "the very evil that the
Fourth Amendment" was designed to eliminate. 76' California state
courts have attempted to address this concern, prohibiting those
section 3067 searches deemed "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing." 177
Under a traditional definition, it would be hard to view suspicionless
searches as anything other than harassing, for they are based purely
on status and without regard to individualized suspicion. However,
the California Supreme Court has defined the term differently.
The California Supreme Court has held that a search is harassing
whenever the "motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative,
reformative or legitimate law enforcement purposes.' 1 78 Given the
narrow construction of this definition, it is not surprising that no state
court has ever disqualified a section 3067 suspicionless search for
violating California's "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing" standard.'79
Moreover, it is unlikely that a court ever will, since it is highly
doubtful that any officer would ever admit to conducting a parole
search for the primary purpose of harassment.
Even if, for argument's sake, California police officers never
purposefully harass parolees, section 3067 searches could still lead to
unintentional harassment. If, for example, five police officers
conducted five separate suspicionless searches of the same parolee in
the course of an hour, none of the searches taken alone would violate
California's "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing" standard-so long
as the searches were uncoordinated. 80 Yet, the result is clearly
harassing for the parolee, who seemingly cannot move two blocks
without being stopped and re-searched by a new officer. With the
growing number of parolees and a shortage of police officers in
California, one could argue that multiple searches of this nature are
176. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 3.
177. People v. Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998).
178. Id. at451.
179. Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 8, at 5 (noting the "emptiness" of the
limitation).
180. This example is similar to the hypothetical proposed by Justice Souter at oral arguments
during Samson. For the exact text of Souter's questioning of California's advocate, Ronald
Niver, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 44-45, Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006)
(No. 04-9728).
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unlikely to occur in practice. 8 ' However, the physical appearance of
many parolees might increase the likelihood of this seeming
improbability.
Given the demographics of the California parolee population,
section 3067 may actually facilitate the harassment of racial
It has often been argued that police officers
minorities.
disproportionately focus on racial minorities in their law enforcement
duties.'8 2 However, this phenomenon-known as racial profiling-is
when it comes to section 3067
arguably even more prevalent
3
suspicionless searches. 1
Today's parolees are nothing more than yesterday's prisoners,
making the racial makeup of recent prison populations particularly
instructive. The state's prison population in 2004 was 28.9 percent
African-American, though that same group makes up a mere 6.7
percent of California's general populace; Hispanics occupied 37
percent of California's prison population during that same period,
81 4
despite accounting for only 32.4 percent of the general population.
Since the 2004 statistics are fairly representative of recent trends, 85 it
seems safe to say that today's parolee population in the state of
California is disproportionately composed of racial minorities.
Based on this fact, it is likely that the State's minorities bear the
Because
brunt of section 3067's suspicionless search regime.
the
parolee
up
the
bulk
of
Hispanics and African-Americans make
86
population,' section 3067 in a sense justifies police officers who
stop minorities to inquire as to their parole status. In fairness, police
officers would likely have no other way of determining the
appropriateness of a section 3067 search since the usual determinant
of individualized suspicion is not required. Still, this line of
181. Leading Cases, Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 125,
190 (2006).
182. See, e.g., R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56
STAN. L. REv. 571 (2003); Anthony E. Mucchetti, Driving While Brown: A Proposalfor Ending
Racial Profilingin Emerging Latino Communities, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2005).
183. Leading Cases, supra note 181, at 191 (noting that certain characteristics-such as race
or indications of gang membership such as tattoos-tend to draw the attention of police and
increase the likelihood of multiple section 3067 searches).
184. UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS, supra note 126, at 50 fig.22.
185. Id. at 52 fig.24 (tracing the racial composition of the prison population over the past four
decades).
186. These two groups accounted for roughly 65 percent of the prison population in 2004. Id.
at 50 fig.22.
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questioning is potentially embarrassing and harassing, even if it does
not result in a formal detention and search. Thus, the problem of
racial profiling in section 3067 searches may extend beyond minority
parolees and impact California's general minority population as
well.'87
Essentially, California's prohibition on "arbitrary, capricious,
and harassing" section 3067 searches is a limitation in name only,
and the statute gives police officers far too much discretion. This
lack of a functional limiting factor arguably makes the statute
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'88 However, section
3067's questionable constitutionality should concern more than just
the state's parolee population.
The following section details
additional problems with the statute--ones that have the potential to
impact non-parolees as well.
D. Section 3067's Infringement on the Rights of Non Parolees
Even if one is not overly sympathetic to the plight of parolees,
section 3067 still merits serious concern because it impacts nonparolees as well. Parole searches can involve "massive intrusion[s]
on the privacy interests of [non-parolee] third persons" solely
because they associate with a parolee.' 89 For example, whenever
police officers conduct a warrantless search of a parolee's residence,
any individual living with that parolee is effectively subjected to a
warrantless search as well. 9 °
In such instances, the privacy interests of non-parolees are
infringed upon regardless of whether the search is suspicionless or
suspicion-based.' Either way, the non-parolee is searched without a
warrant in violation of general Fourth Amendment rules. However,
187. The scope of this problem would probably be exceedingly difficult to measure because
most of these exchanges are likely to go unreported.
188. See Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2204 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]f
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be replaced with [other] measures to protect
against the state actor's unfettered discretion.").
189. People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251, 1269 (Cal. 1986).
190. As discussed supra notes 2, 4-6, and accompanying text, a search of a residence
generally requires a warrant, but this requirement is relaxed for parolees in light of the peculiar
supervisory problems they present.
Thus, individuals living with parolees must-at a
minimum-forfeit their general right to be free of warrantless searches.
191. See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2202 (noting that both suspicionless searches and suspicionbased searches present the potential for the same constitutional encroachments on third parties'
Fourth Amendment rights).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 41:413

the intrusion is arguably more severe when the search is
suspicionless.
A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. In Case One,
officers-operating under the reasonable belief that a parolee is
selling drugs out of his home--do not obtain a warrant prior to
searching the residence, which the parolee shares with his nonparolee wife. In Case Two, officers conduct a suspicionless search
of the same couple's residence, this time without any suspicion of
illegal activity.'92
In both instances, the non-parolee wife is subjected to a
warrantless search despite technically possessing all protections
afforded under the Fourth Amendment. However, in the first case,
the intrusion on the wife's Fourth Amendment rights seems far less
obscene. Through her free association with a parolee who-at least
from an objectively reasonable standpoint-appears to be up to no
good, the wife in the first case arguably forfeits some of her Fourth
Amendment protections. The same rationale does not logically apply
in the second instance to the wife who is subjected to the
suspicionless search. Hence, while suspicion-based searches can
certainly intrude on the Fourth Amendment rights of non-parolees,
section 3067 searches of the suspicionless variety offend more core
constitutional values.
The practice of admitting evidence seized during section 3067
searches against non-parolee third parties is likewise problematic.
Under People v. Middleton,'93 courts can admit evidence seized
through the extension of a valid section 3067 search against a nonparolee third party.'94 Of course, the search in Middleton was based
on reasonable suspicion, or perhaps even probable cause.195 As such,
the court's decision to admit the seized evidence against
Middleton-a non-parolee-was hardly remarkable.'96
192. The Case Two hypothetical is similar to the facts of Motley, discussed supra Part 1I.B.

Motley's home was subjected to a suspicionless section 3067 search when officers believed,
albeit erroneously, that a parolee lived with her. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (9th

Cir. 2005).
193. 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813 (Ct. App. 2005). For a more complete treatment of Middleton, see
supra Part II.B.

194. Id. at 818.
195. Id. at 814-16 (detailing the facts which, taken together, certainly amount to
particularized suspicion surrounding the search).

196. See id. at 818-19 (detailing the Court's holding). Other courts have reached similar
conclusions when a parole search is based on reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v.
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Nevertheless, Middleton clearly leaves certain evidentiary issues
unresolved-namely those surrounding suspicionless searches
conducted under section 3067. Ultimate resolution of these issues,
however, is easy to predict. It is only a matter of time before
evidence seized pursuant to a section 3067 suspicionless search is
admitted against a non-parolee third party. Because suspicionless
section 3067 searches would be constitutionally unreasonable if they
were applied directly to non-parolees, one can argue that
exclusionary rule principles should apply to evidence seized pursuant
to such searches.'97 Using the exclusionary rule in this manner would
protect the rights of non-parolees, and it would not hinder the state's
ability to monitor parolees effectively.
In all likelihood, however, the exclusionary rule would be of no
help to non-parolees. The exclusionary rule only applies to evidence
seized during an unreasonable search,'98 and the United States
Supreme Court in Samson upheld the reasonableness of section
3067. ' Therefore, unless Samson is overruled, a non-parolee will
never be able to successfully exclude from trial the fruit of a valid
section 3067 search.
This result crystallizes one of section 3067's most alarming
inadequacies. Section 3067 is aimed solely at California's parolees,
a narrow subset of the population, but the statute is clearly broad
enough to catch non-parolees in its net. The statute robs nonparolees of their Fourth Amendment rights without any justification
whatsoever. Unlike parolees, who by sole virtue of their status have
reduced Fourth Amendment rights,"0 non-parolees should rightfully

Cannon, No. 93-1377, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 31828 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1994) (admitting
evidence of drug distribution seized pursuant to a valid warrantless parole search against a nonparolee wife where the search was based upon reasonable suspicion of illegal activity on the part
of the parolee).

197. The exclusionary rule, which suppresses criminal evidence seized pursuant to an
unreasonable search or seizure, was established by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Exclusionary rule principles have been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Hence, while there is no textual basis in the

U.S. Constitution for the exclusionary rule, it has been applied by the United States judicial
system for nearly a century.
198. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398-99.
199. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2202 (2006).
200. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (finding that the state's interest in
monitoring parolees allows for certain Fourth Amendment infringements "that would not be
constitutional if applied to the public at large").
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enjoy all the protections normally afforded by the United States
Constitution. Section 3067 rides roughshod over this principle.
The questionable application of section 3067 to third parties and
parolees indicates that the statute would seriously benefit from some
alterations. Section 3067, despite judicial decisions to the contrary,
displays numerous characteristics of patent unreasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, what follows are proposed
changes to section 3067 that would make the statute's
constitutionality less debatable.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES

Unless the United States Supreme Court revisits its decision in
Samson, section 3067 suspicionless searches are in no danger of
being ruled unconstitutional. Therefore, despite the arguments made
in this note, California has no duty to repeal the statute. Nonetheless,
it might be time for legal scholars to educate Californians regarding
the constitutional deficiencies that arguably plague section 3067.
If California's voters become aware of the injustices perpetrated
by section 3067, they might support an amendment to the statute or a
restructuring of the state's parolee supervisory program. However,
because many voters probably care little about the constitutional
rights of convicted criminals, any proposed changes to section 3067
would face an uphill battle. Thus, for such changes to be accepted
by the voting populace, they would need to effectively address the
concerns that prompted California voters to pass section 3067 in the
first place.2 °'
A. What Is Needed?
First and foremost, any change to section 3067 would need to
allow the state to battle recidivism and effectively supervise
California's sizeable parolee population. As discussed above,
California's recidivism rate is higher than that of any other state in
20 3
the nation.20 2 Still, despite the misleading nature of that statistic,

201. For a discussion of these concerns, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
202. Samson,.126 S. Ct. at 2200.
203. For a discussion regarding the danger of placing too much emphasis on California's
recidivism rate, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 125-29.
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the number of new parolees released in California is unquestionably
high-around 125,000 a year. 4
Given the nature of California's parole system, change is
unlikely. Since 1977, when California passed the Determinate
Sentencing Law, the state's parolee population has steadily grown.2 5
Under this law, most prisoners receive determinate sentences that
indiscriminately qualify them for parole upon completion of their
sentence.20 6
The growing number of parolees in California,
especially when combined with the state's high recidivism rate,
presents a legitimate and compelling state supervisory interest.
Section 3067 was designed to address this interest.
In
eliminating the requirement of reasonable suspicion, section 3067
strove to make the supervision of parolees easier for the state and its
agents.0 7
However, the statute appears to be ineffective.
California's recidivism rate has remained steady since section 3067
was passed in 1996.208 Arguably, if the statute actually reduced
recidivism, the effect would have been realized by now. Even if the
statute facilitates the supervision of parolees, section 3067's Fourth
Amendment intrusions can hardly be justified if recidivism rates go
largely unchanged. Still, it is unquestionable that California has an
interest in supervising its large parolee population, and any changes
to section 3067 must pay heed to this concern.
There are other interests at stake as well. Though seemingly
taking a backseat to the state's concern over the supervision of
parolees, California's parole system also seeks to reintegrate parolees
back into society. 9 To meet this goal, the state must create an
environment that allows the parolee to establish a "pro-social"
identity that is committed to the values of good citizenship. 0
204. UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS, supra note 126, at 65 fig.32.
205. Id.at 64.
206. Id. California's most dangerous prisoners-those convicted of particularly heinous
crimes such as murder or kidnap for ransom-still receive indiscriminate sentences that subject
them to parole board review. Id. at 65.
207. AB No. 2284 ANALYSIS, supra note 1.
208. TRENDS IN STATE PAROLE, supra note 133, at 10 tbl.15.
209. Brief of Amicus Curiae Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants in Support of
Petitioner at 2, Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (No. 04-9728) ("The unquestionable
goal of parole [is] to serve as a transition for the former offender to a law-abiding life")
[hereinafter Brief of C.U.R.E.].
210. See, e.g., Stephen Farrall & Shadd Maruna, Desistance-FocusedCriminalJustice Policy
Research: Introduction to a Special Issue on Desistancefrom Crime and Public Policy, 43
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Arguably, the best way to achieve this desired result is for the state to
treat its parolees like regular members of society." ' In so doing, the
state allows its parolees to establish new civic-minded identities
characterized by normal relationships and traditional liberties."' Of
course, leaving parolees entirely to their own druthers would be
highly imprudent. As evidenced by California's high recidivism
rates, the transition away from criminal tendencies is not smooth for
many parolees. State supervision is thus an essential component of
parolee reintegration into society. However, the development of a
new identity distinct from the parolee's deviant past and rooted
firmly in social values also aids in reintegration.1 3
Section 3067 suspicionless searches may in fact impede a
parolee's ability to successfully reenter society. For one, by
subjecting him to a suspicionless search, society is essentially telling
a parolee that he is a "pre-designated criminal self-suspected of
criminal behavior."214 This message erodes any positive progress a
parolee might be making toward developing a pro-social identity." 5
Suspicionless searches prevent parolee reintegration into society
in other ways as well. As previously discussed, section 3067
potentially subjects a third party who is associated with a parolee to
severe privacy intrusions.2 6 Because of this, many individuals will
likely choose to disassociate themselves from parolees.2 17 Without
the ability to have normal, supportive relationships, parolees will
likely struggle to become functional members of society, leading to a
higher probability of recidivism.21 Thus, section 3067 may frustrate
rather than foster the parolee's reintegration into society.
CR!M. JUST 358,
361 (2004),
available at http://www.blackwellHOWARD J.
synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-2311.2004.00336.x; Judith Rumgay, Scripts for Safer
Survival: Pathways Out of Female Crime, 43 HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 405, 407-08 (2004),
availableat http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1 11 1/j.1468-2311.2004.00338.x.

211. Brief of C.U.R.E., supra note 209, at 4.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
For a more thorough discussion of this point, see supra text accompanying notes 189-92.

217. People v. Sanders, 73 P.3d 496, 508 (Cal. 2003) (noting that, because of the potential for
privacy intrusions under section 3067, "[m]any law-abiding citizens might choose not to open
their homes to probationers [or parolees]" (quoting People v. Robles, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 914,

921(Ct. App. 2000))).
218. Id.
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B. What Can Be Done?
To begin, section 3067 should be amended so as not to apply to
third parties. Granted, searches of non-parolees' homes-as in
Motlej' 9-might be necessary, for a parolee should not be able to
avoid state supervision simply because he associates or lives with a
non-parolee. However, even if certain third party privacy intrusions
are impossible to avoid, any evidence seized pursuant to a
suspicionless search should not be admissible against a third party.22
Although section 3067 should not apply to non-parolees, the
statute as it pertains to parolees is far more logical. If the state's
voters and legislators were even to consider an amendment to section
3067, the parole system's dual goals of parolee supervision and
parolee reintegration into society must be effectively addressed.
Arguably, the easiest way to placate both these interests is to simply
add a reasonable suspicion requirement to section 3067. This
probably would not detrimentally impact recidivism rates, since all
other states conduct only suspicion-based parole searches while still
enjoying nominally lower recidivism rates than California. Perhaps
even more importantly, the addition of a reasonable suspicion
requirement to section 3067 would liberate parolees of the social
stigma associated with suspicionless searches. However, while a
reasonable suspicion requirement would theoretically satisfy both
interests of the state, it is probably an overly idealistic solution given
the state's current stance on the issue.
Assuming California remains committed to some form of a
suspicionless search regime, one can only propose subtle changes to
section 3067. For instance, the state could limit section 3067's
suspicionless search regime to only those parolees deemed especially
dangerous or likely to commit more crimes. 21 This modification to
section 3067 would make the statute far more reasonable under the
219. Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2005). For a discussion of the facts
surrounding the search of Motley's residence, see discussion supra Part II.B.
220. While no court has yet decided whether evidence seized pursuant to a section 3067
suspicionless search can be admitted against non-parolee third parties, the issue will probably be
decided at some point. In all likelihood, such evidence will be found to be admissible against
non-parolees. For a discussion of this topic, and the reasons behind this prediction, see supra text
accompanying notes 197-99.
221. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2207 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "this
might have been a different case had a court or parole board imposed the condition at issue based
on specific knowledge of the individual's criminal history and projected likelihood of
reoffending").
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Fourth Amendment by effectively introducing a modicum of
particularized suspicion.
Limiting section 3067's application to searches conducted by
parole officers would likewise improve the statute from a
constitutional standpoint.222 After all, the supervision of parolees is a
well-recognized special need of the state, and courts have
consistently validated suspicionless searches conducted by parole
officers under special needs doctrine. 3 Thus, the state could retain a
limited suspicionless search regime while still meeting the
constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION

As this note illustrates, section 3067's constitutional deficiencies
are quite numerous. For one, neither traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis nor any established exception to general search-and-seizure
rules appears to justify the statute's suspicionless searches.
Moreover, while the statute no doubt strives to combat the state's
high rate of recidivism, whether it has been even remotely successful
is highly questionable. Section 3067 also invites numerous forms of
harassment of both parolees and non-parolees.
These problems notwithstanding, slight changes to section 3067
could go a long way towards making it more reasonable under the
However, at the core of section 3067's
Fourth Amendment.
constitutional inadequacy is the statute's lack of an individualized
suspicion requirement. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissenting
opinion in Samson, "[t]he requirement of individualized suspicion
...is the shield the Framers selected to guard against the evils of

arbitrary action, caprice, and harassment." 2 4 Therefore, to bring the
statute into full and indisputable compliance with the Fourth
Amendment, some element of individualized suspicion must be
introduced. Failing to impose such a requirement merely pays
"lipservice to the end" and overlooks section 3067's questionable
means. 5 The time has come to stop ignoring the constitutional
deficiencies of section 3067 simply because it primarily applies to

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).
Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2207.
Id.

Fall 2007]

PAROLEES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

445

the long-marginalized parolee population, for doing so dishonors the
Fourth Amendment and deteriorates the protections it affords.
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